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Over the past decade two themes have emerged as orga-

nizing principles in natural resources policy. One, ecosystem management, builds a framework for landscape–level
decision making (Christensen et al. 1996). The other, ecosystem services, opens a new dimension for thinking about
what we hope to achieve through ecosystem management
(Daily 1997; Costanza et al. 1997). The convergence of
these two themes has become a driving force behind the
concept of agricultural multifunctionality, the idea that
farms can have multiple outputs—not just commodities—and thus can contribute to several societal objectives
simultaneously (Jordan et al. 2007; OECD 2001).
Agriculture has been engaged in ecosystem management
since long before the term came into the natural resources
policy lexicon. Farms alter and then manage ecological processes and functions on small and large scales. In so doing,
farms reconfigure ecological attributes to maximize what
are known as provisioning services—the food, fiber, energy,
and other commodities supplied by nature (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) 2005). Farms manage these
provisioning services to optimize on–site farm production,
often at the expense of off–site environmental conditions.
Farms are associated, for example, with soil erosion, nutrient and pesticide runoff, and groundwater depletion (Ruhl
2000; Vitousek, Mooney, Lubchenco and Melillo 1997).
Another off–site impact of farming heretofore little noticed, however, is the depletion of regulating services. These
are the economically beneficial results of ecosystem functions that modulate ecological conditions, such as gas sequestration, water recharge, pollination, temperature and
humidity regulation, and stormwater adsorption (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Unlike provisioning
services, the market value of which is embedded in commodity prices and thus easily measured and monitored,
regulating services tend to behave more like nonmarket
public goods (Costanza and Farber 2002). Farms thus have
all the incentive to optimize provisioning services available
to them, but little incentive to provide regulating services

that benefit other lands (Swinton, Lupi, Robertson and
Landis 2006). The question is whether a renewed focus on
agricultural multifunctionality using the balance between
provisioning and regulating services as its fulcrum can lead
to new ideas about how to strike a more socially optimal
balance for agricultural production (Abler 2004; Dobbs
and Pretty 2004; Smith 2006). This essay outlines the factors that must be considered as that conversation unfolds.

A Framework for Thinking about Farms and Ecosystem Services
In The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services (2007), Steven
Kraft, Christopher Lant, and I build an analytical framework for identifying obstacles to socially optimal management of ecosystem services and designing effective policy
responses. The framework moves through three stages.
First, place the problem in its ecological, geographic, and
economic contexts. Second, examine and assess the capacity
of existing property rights, regulations, and social norms.
Third, identify policy drivers and models, the trade–offs of
different policy approaches, and the instruments and institutions that are well suited to transition to new policy
designs. The question of whether and how farms can move
to new ecosystem service production frontiers presents an
opportunity for application of our framework.

Context
Farms, individually and in working agricultural landscapes,
have ecological, geographic, and economic attributes that
influence the stream of ecosystem services they manage
and provide. In this respect farming is perhaps the classic
case study of the obstacles society faces in designing policy
around the goal of yielding appropriate flows of regulating
ecosystem services.
Almost nothing takes place on a farm without ecological impacts somewhere else. In this respect a farm is like
any other ecological unit—changes in one ecosystem usually affect other ecosystems, however we draw the boundar-
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ies. But as highly managed ecological
units, farms significantly tilt the production frontier for ecosystem services toward provisioning services and
away from regulating services (MEA
2005; OECD 2001). Ecological
practices at a cornfield are designed
to produce corn efficiently within
the relevant regulatory environment.
Putting aside the question whether
regulation of farms has established appropriate environmental performance
baselines (Ruhl 2000), unless paid
to provide regulating services such
as carbon sequestration, one would
not expect to find significant flows
of off–site regulating services from
farms except as incidental to management of provisioning services. Hence,
the ecological context for agriculture
with respect to ecosystem services is
that we need to know more about the
geographic and economic contexts
before we can assess the prospects of
realigning the ecological profile.
Agriculture presents a difficult
geographic scenario for purpose of
developing generalized strategies for
ecosystem services. Farms are numerous, dispersed, come in all sizes, and
produce many different commodities under many different climate
and landscape conditions. Farms
also manage ecological resources for
relatively small spatial scales (the
farm) and short temporal scales (the
next harvest). The focus on optimizing on–site provisioning services also
tends to sever farms and larger agricultural landscapes from surrounding
ecological resources. Managing ecosystem services sustainably, by contrast, requires multi–scalar approaches that integrate connected ecological
units across space and time (Holling,
Gunderson and Peterson 2002).
These geographic disconnects
strongly influence the economics of
farming and the bias toward provisioning services. The payoff for providing regulating services, assuming
some mechanism for compensation,
is likely to be marginal compared to

commodity production or, worse,
selling to urban development interests. In the absence of any compensation, economically rational farmers
will not provide free regulating services to off–site lands unless doing so is
incidental to optimization of on–site
commodity production or is forced
by regulation (Daly and Farley 2003).
Promoting farm multifunctionality,
therefore, is a balancing exercise between providing farms the flexibility
to continue benefiting from their skill
at managing provisioning services
on the one hand, and providing the
impetus to produce more regulating services for society on the other.
Moreover, market distortions from
subsidies, which have promoted intensive production on marginal and
environmentally sensitive lands, have
made it only that much more difficult
to integrate ecosystem service values
into agricultural production decisions. Society cannot assume that the
flow of regulating services off of farms
(or any land for that matter) will continue to be provided for free, lest they
not be provided at all, nor can we
expect farmers to forego the incentives the collection of production and
insurance subsidies deliver. Ideally,
the economics of farming, including
market distorting subsidy policies,
can be worked on to change the flow
of services, rather than forcing the issue through command–and–control
regulation.

Existing Capacity
Farms are often portrayed in policy
circles as the “first stewards of the
land.” As noted above, however, what
this really means is that agriculture
has done a very effective job at stewarding land for provisioning services,
and the evidence is that this has come
at considerable cost to not only the
environment, but also the supply of
regulating services to society. The
negative environmental externalities
of farms, though well documented
to be significant and pervasive, have
persisted for decades even while other

polluting industries have been subjected to intense social pressures to
change (Ruhl 2000). This legacy will
make it all the more difficult to overcome the associated effect that farms
are depleting regulating services of
tremendous value to society.
To a large extent we are in this
position as a result of an even longer history of the development of
property rights in such a way as to
deter the production of regulating
services. Although true stewardship
was promoted by the British common law of property as a result of its
densely settled agricultural landscape,
the open frontier of American settlement prompted common law courts,
gradually but unmistakably, to shift
away from doctrines promoting stewardship and toward pro–development
doctrines (Sprankling 1996). In short,
there is nothing in American property
law to suggest to a landowner that
there is any advantage to continuing
to supply regulating services to society, much less an obligation to do so.
Nor has regulation filled this gap.
While other industries are evolving
through second and third generations
of environmental regulation, the
regulation of agriculture is decades
behind the curve in terms of scope
and innovation. To be sure, the task
of regulating hundreds of thousands
of farms raising different crops and
livestock under different conditions
around the nation would be daunting.
But rather than try, federal and state
legislatures have provided farms what
amounts to a safe harbor from environmental regulation, and agriculture
has fought tooth–and–nail against
any retreat (Ruhl 2000). To this day
there is no clear message in regulatory frameworks for what the baseline
norm of environmental performance
is for farms, other than there is none.
As a consequence, opening a discussion of farms and ecosystem services
runs headfirst into the ecological,
geographic, and economic problems
discussed above, with capacity for
building policies existing in what
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is truly a vacuum in so far as property rights, regulations, and norms are
concerned.

Policy Design
Farming thus typifies what Kraft,
Lant, and I (2007) call the Tragedy of
Ecosystem Services. In the absence of
regulation or incentives to steer them
toward production of regulating services, farms naturally manage their
ecological resource base toward the
provisioning services associated with
the production of agricultural commodities. Unlike Hardin’s famous
Tragedy of the Commons (1968),
which resulted in an over–exploitation of the resource base, the Tragedy of Ecosystem Services results in
undersupply of valuable regulating
services. And whereas better design
of property rights, regulations, and
norms has been shown to overcome
the Tragedy of the Commons (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard and
Policansky 1999), as noted above
there has been little traction gained
on the effects of farming from either
of those sources.
Of course, it is important to stay
focused on what the goal of agricultural multifunctionality is. We
do want farms effectively to manage provisioning services to provide
society food, fiber, and energy. And
we should not force farms unfairly to
bear the cost of supplying regulating
services to society in addition. We pay
farmers for corn; how much should
we also pay them for supplying carbon sequestration and groundwater
recharge? The answer to the Tragedy
of Ecosystem Services when it comes
to agriculture cannot be simply to
regulate farms toward greater production of regulating services. That is
not only politically unrealistic, it may
also be economically inefficient and
normatively inappropriate. On the
other hand, just like all landowners,
we should demand that farmers meet
a minimum baseline of environmental performance as part and parcel of
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respecting the property rights of others before it would be appropriate to
consider paying them for higher performance levels.
An intelligent approach, therefore, must start with identification of
the drivers at the interface between
agriculture and ecosystem services
and developing a model of how these
drivers operate. How do farm subsidy
programs influence farm behavior toward ecosystem services? How do the
upstream and downstream food and
fiber industries affect farm behavior toward ecosystem services? If we
were to change these or other conditions, how would farms respond with
respect to ecosystem services? And
which regulating ecosystem services
do we wish to promote?
As we understand more about
how and why farms manage ecosystem services in particular ways, we
must then widen the lens to consider
the trade–offs associated with different policy approaches (Rodruiguez et
al. 2006). How would encouraging
farms to shift toward greater production of regulating services, however accomplished, affect farm income, food
prices, and land costs? Who would
benefit, and by how much, where,
and when? Would moving a significant portion of existing agricultural
lands into, say, carbon sequestration,
simply prompt conversion of undisturbed lands into farming to replace
lost food supply? Would promoting
a particular regulating service such as
carbon sequestration, have a trade–off
effect with other regulating services,
such as groundwater recharge? How
will other services that farms might
provide, such as providing cultural
and historical context for surrounding communities, be enhanced or
degraded by moving to greater farm
multifunctionality?
Once these trade–offs are better
understood, the difficulties of transitioning to new policy regimes can be
identified. The costs and benefits of
new policies almost never are evenly
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distributed. For example, are global,
national, regional, or local regulating services to be favored, and which
interests are affected positively and
negatively by that decision? What
new skill sets will farmers need to
acquire to take advantage of the new
policies, and how much will gaining
them cost? Will agricultural communities prosper with increased farm
multifunctionality? Those who stand
to “lose” under new policy regimes
are likely to oppose them unless their
interests are appropriately accounted
for in the transition. After decades of
habituating farms (and farm communities) to subsidies designed around
provisioning services, it may be unfair and unwise to shift to new policies without addressing the impact to
those interests most affected. Should
those farms be exempt from new programs, or compensated for losses suffered, or simply forced to play under
the new rules?
Ultimately, if promoting greater
production of regulating services is
the goal for agricultural policy over
the next decade, we must choose the
instruments and institutions to make
it happen. As with almost all else in
agricultural policy, political expediency will point toward incentive programs administered through federal
agencies. Indeed, putting aside the
politically charged question of what
baseline of performance to demand
from farms, a strong case can be made
for incentive–based approaches, as it
is appropriate for farms to receive at
least some compensation for satisfying public demand for economically
valuable regulating services. But federal agencies may be poorly equipped
to administer the incentives for all
relevant services. Ecosystem services
are, after all, benefits to human populations, meaning they satisfy demand
at different scales. Some services relevant at national and global scales,
such as carbon sequestration, seem
well suited for incorporation into
federal programs designed to influence land retirement or crop selec-

tion. By contrast, ecosystem services
such as groundwater recharge, water
quality control, and sediment capture
are most valuable to local populations. Farmers should be paid in such
cases to provide local services, but
only based on local demand, meaning local government programs are
more likely to calibrate compensation
for local services efficiently. Indeed, as
the economic values of ecosystem services become better appreciated, local
land trusts and other nongovernmental organizations are also likely to play
an expanding role in providing payments and other incentives for farm
multifunctionality.
The point is to ensure that incentives for ecosystem services, as
opposed to general environmental
and ecological performance, are demand driven, not supply driven. In
this sense policies designed to promote farm production of regulating
services may give multifunctionality
a renewed purpose and goal at local
scales, connecting farms to their urban and suburban surroundings in
ways that make all interests recognize
the advantages of maintaining working agricultural landscapes.

A New Direction?
The concept of ecosystem services is
no panacea for agricultural policy, but
agricultural policy must awaken to its
message. For decades, social, political, and economic forces have driven
farms to manage ecological resources
toward production of food, fiber, and
energy commodities. They have done
so well, but at the expense of maintaining the stock of natural capital
necessary to provide a sustainable flow
of ecosystem services of more general
benefit to society, such as groundwater recharge, water purification, and
flood control. Natural disasters and
the effects of climate change are focusing society on the value of those
services. While it may be a long time
before we think of buying units of services from farms the way we do ears

of corn at the grocery store, it is not
too soon to think of ways to change
the economic incentives farmers face
to induce production of a more balanced portfolio of commodities and
services. Doing so through Farm Bill
reform, reorienting “green” subsidy
programs toward a more multifunctional agricultural suite of outputs,
will be an important component of
the effort. But the goal of balanced,
sustainable flows of ecosystem services from agricultural lands presents
new opportunities for state and local
programs to tap into and promote
farm multifunctionality with true
demand–driven market incentives.
In the long run, such measures could
reconnect agricultural lands and their
surrounding communities in ways
federal policy could never hope to
achieve.
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